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Introduction
Imagine for a moment that you are sitting in the jury box. Plaintiff's
counsel, clad solemnly in blue, rises to make his opening statement. You
lean forward expectantly, eager after days of boredom in the jury assem-
bly room to confront and understand the issues you will be called upon
to decide. Counsel clears his throat, and begins his statement...
Your Honor, Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury .... My name is
Jonathan Smith, and I have the privilege of representing MaxTech
Corporation in this action. Using sophisticated CAD/CAM computer
software of its own design, MaxTech designs and manufactures, in its
own submicron fabrication facility, CMOS EPROM's and EEPROM's
of 256K and greater density. MaxTech is the industry leader with re-
spect to this class of nonvolatile memory devices; with minimum fea-
ture sizes below one micron, access times of less than 25 nanoseconds
and endurances of more than a million cycles. In addition, as a result
of its use of proprietary process techniques developed at great expense
and great effort, MaxTech's process achieves the highest throughput
and probe yields, the lowest defect density, and the fewest mask levels
of any CMOS process in the industry. Considering the fact that
MaxTech's process features an annealed oxynitride dielectric less than
60 angstroms thick, and threshold voltages of 1.65 volts, I think you'll
agree with me that this combination of speed and reliability is truly
amazing.
After concluding the remainder of his mind-numbing opening,
counsel thanks you and takes his seat, pleased with the precision of his
remarks and the technical mastery of the subject matter he has so obvi-
ously achieved. What he fails to notice is the look on your face, one well
known to generations of high-school chemistry teachers-the dull stare,
the eyes disconnected and glazed. Although he doesn't yet know it,
counsel has, only five minutes into the trial, alienated and confused the
jury, forfeited any advantage he might have gained from an effective
opening statement, and handed his adversary a golden opportunity to
seize the heart and minds of the jury.
Although the opening set forth above is a somewhat exaggerated
example of how not to engage the attention and interest of a lay trier of
fact, it is a sad fact that in too many cases, counsel founder in the presen-
tation of technologically complex subject matter to a lay jury or judge,
failing utterly to make either the technology or their client's position
comprehensible to the trier of fact. If you speak to the jury in jargon, or
talk over their heads, at least four things can happen, all of them bad:
1) The jury will not understand what you are talking about. As a re-
sult, any opportunity you might have had to begin the process of
persuading the jury will be lost.
2) The jury will be bored and frustrated. Since you are the person
responsible for that condition, their principal feeling toward you-
and through you, toward your client-will be irritation.
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3) Having witnessed the jury's reaction to your approach, opposing
counsel may conclude that she had better speak simply and clearly,
doing whatever is necessary to make her points understood. Thus,
the jury will likely understand her side of the case, putting her at an
immediate strategic advantage.
4) The jury will perceive the contrast between your opening and your
opponent's, and will be grateful to her for speaking to them in a
way they can understand. This completes the rout, giving your op-
ponent an immediate emotional advantage as well.
This article discusses some of the problems and pitfalls one en-
counters in presenting a technologically complex case to a lay judge or
jury. Wherever possible, I will try to provide examples of ways to avoid
these pitfalls, including a number of procedural devices that can be used
to improve the presentation of these difficult cases. None of these devices
is appropriate in every case; in some they may be counterproductive.
Even more importantly, no procedural device can substitute for the sim-
ple clarity of expression that is the hallmark of an experienced and able
trial lawyer. To the extent, however, that some of these procedures facil-
itate and simplify the presentation of evidence and argument, their use in
a technologically complex case should be considered.
I
Put Yourself in the Shoes of the Judge and the Jury
It seems so obvious to make your case intelligible to the jury. Why
is it, then, that counsel so often fail to do so in technologically complex
cases?
Once upon a time, counsel knew little about the complex technology
at issue in his case. Over several years, however, through the course of
document discovery, long sessions with his client and experts, and labori-
ous study, he has mastered this little comer of the technological universe.
Despite the knowledge he has gained, however, something precious
has been lost-perspective. Counsel may have forgotten how little he
once knew and how difficult this technology seemed at first. As a result,
he now assumes that the jury shares some of his hard-won
understanding.
Counsel has made a serious mistake. He should never forget how
formidable and opaque all but the simplest technology appears to the
uninitiated. Do not assume that the jury has the slightest understanding
of the simplest aspect of the technology. In fact, assume they understand
nothing and that they must be led, step by step, along the road to under-
standing. This does not mean that they should be spoken down to, or
treated like simpletons. To the contrary, it means that they should be
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treated with respect, and should be given, in building block fashion, all of
the tools they will need finally to understand your case.
There is another phenomenon at work as well. Having mastered the
technology-or at least the jargon-a perverse and self-destructive im-
pulse, known in the Latin as ego technologus idiots, sweeps over the ad-
vocate. Caught in its grip, counsel succumbs to the urge to show off his
technical wizardry and jargon, and technobabble dances lightly off his
tongue. He is at home with the technology, his manner all but cries out;
the jury should believe what he says.
Assuming they have managed to remain conscious, the jury has
probably not been equally impressed with counsel's technical wizardry.
At worst, the jury will find such showboating to be obnoxious; at best, it
will pass over their heads, leaving them confused as to exactly what
counsel might have been trying to say. In either case, counsel has failed
effectively to communicate his client's position to the trier of fact.
Not all problems associated with the presentation of complex cases
to a lay trier of fact are caused by counsel's insensitivity or ego. Some-
times the technology in these cases is so complex that, despite counsel's
best intentions, it is difficult to explain it in understandable terms without
oversimplifying. When confronted with this situation, counsel has two
choices. One is to throw up her hands and do anything she can to get her
case before a technically proficient trier of fact. More about that later.
The other option is for counsel to put aside her intellectual and techno-
logical scruples, and oversimplify the technology to the extent necessary
to permit the judge and jury to understand it. Whether this is accom-
plished by a clever use of analogy, by a simple hand-drawn diagram, or
by use of one of the procedural devices I will talk about in a moment,
counsel must allow the judge and jury to grasp enough of the technology
to understand and follow her case. Otherwise, counsel faces the prospect
of an exchange like the judge in the ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v.
IBM' case had with a member of the jury:
Court: Do you know what an interface is?2
Juror: Yes.
Court: What's that?
Juror: The interface is the-I am not good in English, your honor.
Court: No, that's all right.
Juror: But it's the interface, you know.
Court: Can you give me an example of that?
1. 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
2. An interface is the connection between a computer and an auxiliary device such as a
disk controller or a printer.
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Juror: Well, if you take a blivet, turn it off one thing and drop it
down, it's an interface change; right?3
II
How to Communicate Complex Subject Matter
The first and most over-arching rule to follow in presenting techno-
logically complex cases is this: be creative. As lawyers, we all have a
tendency to think of the rules and procedures that govern the conduct of
trials as a given, a fixed course that must be followed, whether they make
sense in a particular case or not. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, however, states that the rules "shall be construed to secure
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."4 In ad-
dition, the Manual for Complex Litigation (Manual) provides for the
adoption of innovative procedures calculated to streamline the trial pro-
cess in an appropriate case.5 A number of procedural devices, some of
which are discussed in the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Manual,
some of which are not, can in an appropriate case, greatly enhance the
presentation of a technologically complex case to a lay judge or jury.
A. Tutorials
Tutorials are usually put on at the outset of a case, prior to opening
statements. They are designed to give the judge and jury a general over-
view of the technology at issue in the trial. In a trade secret case a few
years ago, both sides agreed to conduct one-hour tutorials explaining the
technology at issue. Our expert, who was a Professor of Engineering at
the University of California at Berkeley, spoke for an hour on the history
of the microchip, on the general principles at work in the field, and on
some of the processes and concepts that the jury would confront in the
weeks ahead. As a professor, he was accustomed to addressing freshman
survey courses at which the level of student sophistication was relatively
minimal. He did an excellent job of leading the jury by the hand through
what might otherwise have been a thorny technical thicket.6
Structure your tutorials to be as hands-on as possible. This allows
the judge and jury to become involved in the process. In a software
copyright case tried several years ago defendant's counsel brought in a
software engineer who taught the jury enough elementary programming
3. Record at 19 ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp., 458 F. Supp. at 490-91, quoted in Note,
The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARV. L. REV. 898, 908 n.60 (1979).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
5. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (2d ed. 1985).
6. Choosing an expert capable of simplifying complex technology is critical to the suc-
cess of a technology tutorial. See supra section 1, subpart E.
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skills to permit them, with his help, actually to write a very simple pro-
gram, complete with simple loops, IF THEN, and GO TO statements.
By the time the tutorial was completed, the jury understood in a mean-
ingful way what software was and how it worked-an understanding I
do not believe they could have achieved simply through listening to a
lawyer or expert explain it to them.7
Tutorials are designed to be instructive, rather than argumentative;
they should not be reported, nothing said during the tutorial should be
admissible as evidence, and the rules of evidence should not apply.
Although, like voir dire, the tutorial provides a wonderful initial opportu-
nity to color the judge and jury in your client's favor, it is perhaps an
even better opportunity to establish your credibility, and the credibility
of your expert, with the jury and with the court. This is a time to build
trust with the jury; save the argument for later.
B. Demonstrative Evidence
Another area in which you can be effective in presenting technologi-
cally complex information to a lay judge or jury is through demonstra-
tive evidence, such as videotapes, charts, graphs, and the like. Over the
years, the technology available for this has become far more sophisti-
cated. There are now, for example, firms devoted entirely to creating
multimedia presentations for the courtroom. The possibilities that these
technologies create for the lawyer are endless. In a patent case involving
semiconductor process patents, for example, computer-generated anima-
tion can show the jury how a chip is built, step by step, mask level by
mask level. Although this technology is extremely expensive-it can cost
hundreds of thousands of dollars to create such a video-it may well
make sense in a case in which the stakes are very high. Alternatively,
there are ways to achieve some of the same effects more cheaply.
In a computer software patent case, counsel used a simple video to
explain to the jury how a computer operating system functioned. The
film, which was made relatively inexpensively, featured a chef-the oper-
ating system-working in a small kitchen-the computer. The chef's job
was to run the kitchen. He would reach over and turn on the food
processor. Then he would halt the food processor, because the operating
system cannot do two things at once. He would then turn on the oven,
which would run for a given period of time before the chef would delay
its operation to give another appliance its turn. The video showed how
7. In conducting a tutorial, however, take extreme care to avoid embarrassing the judge
or any juror during the tutorial process. Not everyone is technologically adept, and frustrating
or embarrassing a judge or jury is obviously something to avoid like the plague.
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the operating system controls the operation of the microprocessor and
the computer as a whole in a way that a dry explanation could not.
Simpler, more traditional demonstrative evidence, such as charts
and graphs, can also be effective in communicating complex concepts to
the jury or judge. However, if you intend to create a piece of demonstra-
tive evidence, use the right test audience. Do not show it to your part-
ners or clients, ask whether they like it, and if they do go forward.
Instead, show it to your neighbor's ten-year-old. Show it to your son's
babysitter. Show it to Mr. Kaiser who delivers chickens in his chicken
truck. Give these people a very short explanation of the case and then
ask them what the chart is supposed to represent. If they do not immedi-
ately grasp its significance, it is probably too complicated. I have a col-
league whose wife is a kindergarten teacher. She did ninety percent of
his courtroom charts, in crayon. I have always felt that he had the best
charts in the courtroom because they were simple and easy to
understand.
C. Interim Summations
Interim summations are an extremely useful device in complex
cases.8 No matter how much care counsel takes to simplify the presenta-
tion of his case, a significant likelihood remains that the jury will be con-
fused on key points. Periodically interrupting the presentation of
evidence permits counsel to sum up what has transpired, and to point out
to the jury the significance of testimony or documents jurors may not
fully have grasped. Although these functions certainly can be accom-
plished in closing argument, reorienting a thoroughly confused jury may
be close to impossible if delayed too long. Interim argument, by contrast,
allows counsel to summarize the case in more manageable segments and
while the testimony is fresh in the mind of the jury. It also provides an
opportunity to "rescue" any jurors who may be lost and adrift in a sea of
technology.
No firm guidelines exist for the use of interim argument. Counsel
should work with one another and the court to develop a scheme appro-
priate for their particular case. In ETSI Pipeline Project v. Burlington
Northern, Inc.,9 a complex antitrust and conspiracy trial in which a
number of innovative procedures were adopted to shorten the trial and
enhance the jury's understanding of the case, each side was allowed six
hours of argument during the course of trial, in addition to the time al-
8. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION supra note 5, at § 22.34.
9. No. B-84-979-CA (E.D. Tex.), cited in C. Michael Buxton & Michael Glover, Manag-
ing a Big Case Down to Size, LITIGATION, Summer 1989, at 22.
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lowed for opening and closing.'" By incorporating demonstrative evi-
dence, portions of videotaped deposition testimony and slides of key
documents into their interim summations, counsel were able to provide
meaningful guidance to the jury on a regular basis throughout the trial.
D. Bifurcation and Ordering of Proof
Judges faced with the immediate prospect of a lengthy and complex
trial tend to have two visceral reactions. The first is to try to settle the
case. The second, encountered when settlement proves impossible, is to
do anything they can to shorten the trial. Thus, judges are often recep-
tive to a motion under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"
to try certain potentially dispositive issues first, in the hope that decision
on such issues may terminate the litigation.
In a patent case, for example, the defendant often argues that the
patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. Section 102(b) 2 because the patented
article was on sale or in public use more than one year prior to the date
the patent application was filed. Because the issue of whether such an
"on-sale bar" exists is potentially case-dispositive, and because a determi-
nation of the issue typically does not require as much technical analysis
or sophistication as do other issues such as infringement and obvi-
ousness, it often makes sense (at least from the alleged infringer's stand-
point) to try the issue first, and many courts have so ordered the proof.13
If the issue is determined in defendant's favor, the patent case is usually
over. If it is not, nothing has been lost, since the issue would have had to
be tried in any event.
Occasionally, judges resist motions to bifurcate a case, or to slice out
certain issues for early trial, on the ground that such "heavy-handed"
judicial intervention unfairly interferes with plaintiff's right to try his
case in the manner he deems best. If you find yourself before a judge
who is sensitive to the prerogatives of counsel, do not give up; exhaustion
and boredom are your chief allies. Simply wait until the jury and court
are drowning in the technology, then renew your motion. You may be
surprised at how receptive the judge, suddenly an aggressive judicial ac-
tivist, may be to your renewed call for a simpler, more expedited
proceeding.
10. Buxton & Glover, supra note 9, at 22, 24.
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 42.
12. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1984).
13. See, e.g., Andrew Corp. v. Cablewave Sys. Inc., 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 742, 744-45 (D.
Conn. 1975).
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E. Choosing the Right Expert
As we all know, experts play a significant role in all types of litiga-
tion, including technology cases. As MaxTech's lawyer, therefore, one of
your first duties will be to retain a qualified expert to testify at trial. So
what do you do? You go out and retain the most expert expert you can
find, the Nobel laureate from Sweden with a ten-page resume, a prolific
publications list, and advanced degrees from M.I.T. and the Sorbonne.
There is only one problem. Mr. Expert has an impenetrable accent, has
for the past 15 years worked only with the foremost experts in his field,
and speaks exclusively in mathematical algorithms, when he deigns to
speak at all.
In a complex case, hiring Mr. Expert may prove to be an enormous
mistake. In such a case, it is critical that your expert be someone who
can relate to the judge and jury, and can translate extremely complex
concepts into terms the judge and jury can understand. When you first
meet with a potential expert, therefore, ask her to explain to you one or
more complex aspects of the technology at issue. If the explanation is
likely to leave a juror more confused than before, you may wish to con-
sider another expert. Indeed, you may wish to recommend her to your
opponent.
III
When to Punt
Sometimes, despite your best efforts, the technology at issue in a
particular case is so difficult and complex that it is simply beyond the
capacity of a lay judge or jury to comprehend. If you find yourself in this
unusual situation, you have several choices.
First, you may wish to consider stipulating to trial of the case before
a Special Master under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53.14 In a case
involving complex technology, of course, the Special Master would pre-
sumably be someone expert (or at least strongly grounded) in the tech-
nology at issue. Judge Wysanski apparently utilized this procedure in a
patent case some years ago, appointing an outstanding expert in the field
as a Master and requiring that he confer with each of the parties and
their staff in the presence of the other and prepare a report to be submit-
ted to the parties and to the court.'5 The parties were then permitted to
examine the Master under oath in open court.16
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
15. See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 509, 553 (1974).
16. Id.
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Although Rule 53(b) provides that reference to a Special Master be
the "exception and not the rule," the consent of the parties is not re-
quired in a case tried to a jury. 17 Be aware, however, that absent stipula-
tion, reference to a Master in a non-jury case is permitted only (1) in
matters of account; (2) where a difficult computation of damages is in-
volved; or (3) where justified by an "exceptional condition.""8 The U.S.
Supreme Court construed the "exceptional condition" language of the
Rule extremely narrowly in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 19 holding that
neither calendar congestion, complexity of issues, nor potential length of
trial was exceptional within the meaning of the Rule.2°
Another device favored by some in complex cases is the appoint-
ment by the court, with or without the agreement of the parties, of an
independent expert to lend expert guidance to the court on technical or
scientific issues raised by the litigation. The authority for such an ap-
pointment can be argued to flow either from Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 53 or from the "inherent powers" of the court.21
One interesting twist on this technique was used, again by the ever-
creative Judge Wysanski, in an extremely complex antitrust case, United
Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States. 2 2 Judge Wyzanski appointed as
his law clerk for that year Carl Kaysen, a renowned and distinguished
economist. The judge later expressed second thoughts regarding this
procedure, however, which he felt may have put him in a position
subordinate to his expert law clerk with respect to technical issues in the
case.
23
For reasons similar to the misgivings expressed by Judge Wysanski,
I tend to resist the appointment of an expert to advise the court on tech-
nical issues. It is difficult to maintain control over the case when an in-
dependent expert is forever whispering in the court's ear. Moreover, if
anyone is going to whisper in the court's ear, I want it to be me. How-
ever, if you feel you have a strong case on the technical merits, but for
whatever reason you are uncomfortable with the judge, perhaps it isn't
the worst thing in the world to throw the ball into an expert's lap.
There are other options that can be pursued when the complexity of
a case is likely to overwhelm a lay jury. Several years ago, I was involved
in the representation of a company accused of misappropriating trade
17. Heifer v. Corona Prods., Inc., 127 F.2d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1942).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
19. 352 U.S. 249 (1947).
20. Id. at 259.
21. See Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737, 743 (6th Cir. 1979) (appointment
of school administration advisory expert in complex school desegregation case approved).
22. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), af'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
23. Leventhal, supra note 15, at 552-53.
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secrets. The alleged secrets related to the process by which nonvolatile
memory chips, known as EPROM's and EEPROM's, were constructed.
As counsel for the defendant, we were concerned that the jury would be
completely unable to understand the technology, and would instead
throw up its hands and conclude that because the technology was com-
plicated, it must also be a trade secret. So at the appropriate time-
which happened to be a settlement conference at which opposing counsel
was insisting that its position on the merits was overwhelmingly strong-
we suggested that the case be tried to an expert jury. The judge thought
that was a great idea, and so the parties stipulated to do precisely that.
We placed an advertisement in several newspapers seeking semicon-
ductor engineers to act as consultants. Responses were directed to the
judge, who screened out any obvious conflicts and then called in poten-
tial candidates for voir dire by counsel. After all challenges had been
exercised, we were left with a jury of engineers, none of whom was expert
in the particular technology at issue in the case, but all of whom had
sufficient background to be able to grasp the issues.
There was one additional wrinkle. We permitted the jurors to ask
questions of the witnesses after direct and cross-examination had been
completed. Over time, a remarkable thing happened. The jury began
aggressively cross-examining the witnesses, asking questions such as:
"Isn't it true that such-and-such was in use at Intel in 1968?" You can
evade a question from counsel, or perhaps even from the court; you bet-
ter not evade a juror. Ultimately, the jury's general position on key is-
sues became sufficiently clear that a settlement was achieved six weeks
into the trial.
IV
Conclusion
Over the past fifteen years, a number of courts and commentators
have begun to consider theories designed to take complex cases away
from juries. One theory has posited a complexity exception to the Sev-
enth Amendment right to jury trial, asserting that such cases were tried
in equity rather than at law in 1789, and thus there is no jury trial right
to "preserve" in such cases.24 Another theory has asserted that it is a
24. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 918 (E.D.
Pa. 1979) (no complexity exception to Seventh Amendment); Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of
Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
43, 107 (1980) (arguing for the existence of a complexity exception).
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denial of due process to require decision by a jury incapable of compre-
hending the issues before it."
Finally, at least one commentator has staked out a middle ground,
arguing that because issues analogous to market structure issues were not
tried to juries in 1789, no right to a jury trial exists with respect to the
modem counterparts of such issues today.26 None of these theories has
found widespread acceptance, however, and none appears likely to be
adopted in the near future.
Thus, until someone decides simply to shuck the lay judge and jury,
and instead try complex cases to technologists, lawyers have an obliga-
tion to make complex technical issues comprehensible to the people
called upon to decide them. Fortunately, if you will pardon the expres-
sion, we have the technology to do so in the vast majority of cases. If we
fail to take creative advantage of the means available to us, however, then
we deserve the irrational decisions that will almost certainly result.
25. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir.
1980) (trial by jury in extremely complex cases violates Due Process Clause of Fifth
Amendment).
26. See Thomas M. Jorde, The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial ofAntitrust Issues,
69 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 66 (1981).
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